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While most people care about having access to legal services when they need them few are 
interested in how legal services are regulated. It is considered a technical subject best left to 
those who actually care, like lawyers themselves. That is what has happened in the United 
States—the regulation of legal services has been left to a small number of lawyers who make 
decisions for the entire country about how legal services can—and, especially, cannot—be 
delivered. They do this in the absence of public accountability or transparency and in the 
wake of near total abdication by state authorities who, on paper, actually have regulatory 
power. The result? As regards “accessible and affordable civil justice,” the World Justice 
Project Rule of Law Index ranks the US 96th of 113 countries. Countries like Afghanistan, 
Belarus, El Salvador, Russia and Uganda are ranked higher. Those countries provide better 
access to civil justice than the United States. The inability of many, if not most, people in the 
US to enforce their rights raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the country’s legal 
system as well as rule of law and democracy itself. In contrast, Australia ranks 40th, Canada 
47th, the UK 60th. While not perfect, they are doing something right. By comparing them to 
the US, this research exposes the direct link between how legal services are regulated and 
how people are—and are not—able to access those services. This research demonstrates how 
the problems plaguing legal services in the United States can be addressed only by radical 
changes: to the rules that govern how legal services may be delivered, to who has the power 
to make those rules, and, ultimately, to the country’s entire regulatory environment. This 
research is based upon an extensive review of both primary and secondary materials and upon 
65 in-depth interviews conducted with those who have created, are managing, are employees 
of, and/or have invested in alternative legal service providers in England & Wales, Australia, 
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I. Importance of Topic 
Many persons in the United States lack access to legal services: While large 
organizations, such as corporations, public sector bodies and high net worth 
individuals are generally able to obtain legal assistance,
1
 most low and middle 
income individuals as well as small businesses are all but shut out. In particular, it is 
estimated that 80% of the legal needs of low income persons in the United States are 
not met.2 This unmet need is so high and so acute, some argue that it constitutes a 
human rights crisis.
3
 Indeed, on the question of affordable and accessible civil 
justice, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index ranks the US 96
th
 out of a total 
of 113 countries, behind places such as Afghanistan, Belarus, El Salvador, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uganda.
4
 This means that persons living in those countries 
have better access to civil justice than Americans do. In contrast, Australia ranks 
40
th
, Canada ranks 47
th




 Those from outside the legal 
profession who attempt to help to address the unmet need in the United States enter a 
dangerous space where they risk fines if not criminal penalties for the unauthorized 
practice of law.
6
 Thus, at present, lawyers are the key to addressing the access to 
justice gap. 
                                                          
1
 Interestingly, large corporations do face some challenges in obtaining legal services, as explained by 
Gillian Hadfield in “Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy 
for the Information Society 8 (2012): 2-8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567712. 
2
 William C. Hubbard, “Remarks of William C. Hubbard, President of the American Bar Association” 
(presentation to Meeting of American College of Trial Lawyers, Miami, Florida, February 28, 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/leadership/office_of_the_president/selected-speeches-of-aba-
president-william-c--hubbard/american-college-of-trial-lawyers--february-2015-.html. See also Ethan 
Bronner, “Right to Lawyer Can Be Empty Promise for Poor,” New York Times, March 15, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/us/16gideon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. See generally Legal 
Services Corporation, “Documenting the Justice Gap in America—The Current Unmet Civil Legal 








 The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-18, http://worldjusticeproject.org/historical-data. 
5
 Laura Snyder, “How Low Can You Go?” Not Just for Lawyers, Feb. 2, 2018, 
http://notjustforlawyers.com/how-low/. 
6
 See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode and Lucy Buford Ricca, “Protecting the Profession or the 
Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement,” Fordham Law Review 82 (2014): 2587-
2610, http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_82/No_6/RhodeRicca_May.pdf; Benjamin H. 
Barton, “The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays,” Fordham Law Review 82 (2014): 
3067-90, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5008&context=flr; Pierce G. 
Hunter, “Constitutional Law—Unauthorized Practice of Law: Driving Legal Business Without a 
License, LegalZoom, Inc., and Campbell v. Asbury Automotive, Inc., 2011 Ark. 157, 381 S.W.3d 
21,” University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 36 (2014): 201-28, 
http://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/5; Gerard J. Clark, “Internet Wars: The Bar 
3 
 
Why does it matter whether everyone who needs legal services is able to access 
them? Our legal systems are designed with lawyers as users, systems are highly 
complex and in many, if not most, instances they are impossible to negotiate, let 
alone negotiate successfully, without assistance of some kind.
7
 Access to justice 
requires that everyone is able to use the legal system effectively; a person cannot 
have recourse to law and cannot have reasonable assurance of being able to enforce 
his/her rights unless that person can gain legal advice and assistance, and ultimately, 
if all else fails, seek recourse to the courts. Legal rights lose their meaning and our 
legal system loses its legitimacy when there are people who cannot seek relief. 
Without meaningful rights, without recourse to law, and without a legitimate legal 
system—that is, without the rule of law—then we must ask: can we have 
democracy? 
 
II. Definition of Topic and Scope of Inquiry 
My study addresses the quality and opportunity of the advice and support of a legal 
nature that persons (as well as businesses and other organizations) receive in the 
United States and the importance of this issue to the broader question of access to 
justice. My enquiry focused on how the manner by which legal services are regulated 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Against the Websites,” Journal of High Technology Law XIII (2013): 247-96, 
https://www.suffolk.edu/documents/jhtl_publications/CLARKMACRO-FINALFINAL.pdf; George 
Leef, “Why The Legal Profession Says LegalZoom Is Illegal,” Forbes, October 14, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2014/10/14/why-the-legal-profession-says-legalzoom-is-
illegal/#580de4037664. These types of assertions date back a century if not more and significantly 
increased in intensity with the Great Depression. See, for example, James Willard Hurst, The Growth 
of American Law: The Law Makers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 319-322; Quintin 
Johnstone, “Unauthorized Practice Controversy: A Struggle among Power Groups,” Kansas Law 
Review 4 (1955): 1-57, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1912. For a summary of each 
state’s approach to the unauthorized practice of law, see American Bar Association Standing 





 See, for example, John M. Greacen, “Services for Self-Represented Litigants in Arkansas: A Report 
to the Arkansas Access to Justice Commission,” July 26, 2013, 2-3, 
http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/file%20attachments/Arkansas%20Final%20Report
%207-26-13.pdf. In describing his research regarding the experiences of unrepresented litigants 
before Arkansas courts, Greacen writes:  
The civil courts and the procedural rules that govern [Americans] in Arkansas and elsewhere 
in the United States have been designed with the expectation that all parties are represented 
by lawyers. The procedures are complicated, the rules are strict and often unforgiving, and 
the jargon used is often incomprehensible to a person without legal training. For persons 
representing themselves to have a fair opportunity to obtain the legal relief to which the facts 
and law of their case entitle them requires a significant amount of assistance—in 
understanding the law and the steps in a legal proceeding, in preparing appropriate legal 
documents, and in assembling and presenting evidence supporting their positions. Ibid., 2. 
4 
 
operates to restrict access to legal services in the United States and how three other 
common law jurisdictions (England & Wales, Australia and Canada) either have 
changed or are in the process of changing their regulations, their regulatory bodies 
and their entire regulatory environments in order to make legal services more 
accessible to their populations. 
 
My study is solution-focused. I propose solutions at three different levels: 
 
Solution Level N°1: My study demonstrates that the rules in the United States 
regarding how legal services may be delivered must be radically overhauled. The 
lawyer monopoly on legal services must be ended. A primary but not exclusive 
objective in ending the monopoly must be to allow a wider variety of structures and 
organizations to provide legal services in addition to traditional law firms. More 
specifically, regulations must be changed in order to allow for lawyers to partner 
with non-lawyers and to allow for non-lawyers to own and manage organizations 
that provide legal services.
8
 This is in-keeping with changes in some of the other 
jurisdictions that I examined in my study. 
 
Solution Level N° 2: My study demonstrates that the rules in the United States 
regarding how legal services may be delivered cannot be radically overhauled 
without making equally radical changes to who exercises the power to make those 
rules. Today de jure regulatory power lies in most cases with the state’s Supreme 
Court or other governmental authority to whom the Court has delegated its authority. 
However, for the most part those Supreme Courts and other authorities have 
abdicated their regulatory power such that the de facto—the actual—power lies with 
the American Bar Association (ABA), a voluntary, national association of lawyers 
and law students.
9
 The ABA has repeatedly demonstrated that it is incapable of 
adopting any regulatory change that—rightly or wrongly—is perceived to threaten 
the interests of those lawyers who control the ABA and who control the local (state 
and other) bar associations to whom the ABA governing body—the House of 
                                                          
8
 Democratizing Legal Services: Obstacles and Opportunities (hereinafter “Democratizing”), xv-xxi, 
1-160, 217-26. Appendix A contains more information about Democratizing.  
9
 Laurel S. Terry, “Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: Reflections on Missed 
Opportunities and the Road Not Taken,” Hofstra Law Review 43 (2014): 117-23, 
http://www.hofstralawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BB.3.Terry_.final2_.pdf. See also 
Barton, “The Lawyer’s Monopoly,” 3080-81; Democratizing, 21-22. 
5 
 
Delegates—is accountable.10 New regulatory authority must be established and that 
authority must be accountable to the American public.
11
 Such amendments to the 
locus of power for legal service rule-making would be similar to some of those seen 
in other jurisdictions that were examined in my study. 
 
Solution Level N° 3: My study demonstrates that radical changes to who exercises 
the power to make the rules cannot be made—that is, new regulatory authority 
cannot be established—without a complete overhaul of the regulatory environment 
for legal services in the United States. In effecting this overhaul, the United States 
must embrace the OECD’s essential elements of effective regulatory policy and in 
particular these six elements: (i) independent regulators who are free from conflicts 
of interest (they must be independent from the legal profession as well as from state 
power),
12
 (ii) accountability and transparency in regulatory decision making,
13
 (iii) 
the placement of regulatory oversight bodies “at the center of government,”14 (iv) 
making regulatory stakeholders, including businesses but also, notably, citizens and 
consumers, part of the regulatory process and paying attention to their voices,
15
 (v) 
the use of evidence-based regulatory impact assessments,
16
 and (vi) the use of a risk-
based approach to regulation.
17
 These appear to be conditions precedent to regulatory 
effectiveness that puts the legal service client at the heart of the system. 
                                                          
10
 James E. Moliterno, The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and Responses to Change 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
11
 Democratizing, xxi-xxvi, 197-216; Modernizing Legal Services in Common Law Countries: Will 
the US Be Left Behind? Hereinafter, “Modernizing”), 171-224, 235-36. Appendix A contains more 
information about Modernizing. 
12
 OECD, Regulatory Policy and Governance: Supporting Economic Growth and Serving the Public 
Interest (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), 9, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/regulatorypolicyandgovernancesupportingeconomicgrowthandservingthepublicinterest.htm; 
David Parker and Colin Kirkpatrick, “Measuring Regulatory Performance -The Economic Impact of 
Regulatory Policy: A Literature Review of Quantitative Evidence,” OECD Expert Paper No.3, 
August, 2012, 11, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/3_Kirkpatrick%20Parker%20web.pdf. 
13
 Parker and Kirkpatrick, “Measuring Regulatory Performance,” 11; OECD CleanGovBiz, 
“Regulatory Policy: Improving Governance,” July, 2012, 3-4, 6-7, 
http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/49256979.pdf. 
14
 Parker and Kirkpatrick, “Measuring Regulatory Performance,” 11; OECD CleanGovBiz, 
“Regulatory Policy,” 6-7. 
15
 Parker and Kirkpatrick, “Measuring Regulatory Performance,” 11; OECD CleanGovBiz, 
“Regulatory Policy,” 4,6; OECD, “Regulatory Policy and the Road to Sustainable Growth,” 2010, 39-
40, https://www.oecd.org/regreform/policyconference/46270065.pdf (hereinafter “OECD Road to 
Sustainable Growth”). 
16
 Parker and Kirkpatrick, “Measuring Regulatory Performance,” 11, 27-32; OECD CleanGovBiz, 
“Regulatory Policy,” 6; OECD Road to Sustainable Growth, 3, 8. 
17
 Parker and Kirkpatrick, “Measuring Regulatory Performance,” 11; OECD CleanGovBiz, 
“Regulatory Policy,” 14; See generally OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the 
Governance of Risk (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264082939-en. 
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III. Why This Scope 
The solutions I propose are not a silver bullet. That is, their implementation, alone, 
will not solve the access to justice problem in the United States in its entirety. A 
number of other factors also require attention. A non-exhaustive list includes: (i) the 
complexity of laws and regulations such that they are often incomprehensible to the 
lay person (and even to many lawyers),
18
 (ii) the complexity and expense of court 
and other judicial procedures,
19
 (iii) the expense and the limitations of legal 
education in the United States (the average post-graduate three-year program can 
cost upwards of $200,000 and more;
20
 few if any law schools in the United States 
prepare law students to address the access to justice problem in the country
21
 and if 
they don’t learn it there, where will they learn it?), and (iv) an expanded use of open 
                                                          
18
 See, for example, about the complexity of US immigration laws: “How the United States 
Immigration System Works,” American Immigration Council , August 2016, 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/how_the_united_states_imm
igration_system_works.pdf; Mark E. Haranzo and Reaz H. Jafri, “Navigating Complex US 
Immigration Laws: US Visas & Taxation, in The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Private 
Client 2019, edited by Jon Conder and Robin Vos,23-27, 8th ed., London: Global Legal Group Ltd, 
2019, https://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Articles/PC19Chapter5Haranzo.pdf. With 
respect to the complexity of US employment laws, see Zach Stabenow, “Employment Law 
Compliance Complexity: Beyond Human Capacity,” GovDocs, May 15, 2018, 
https://www.govdocs.com/employment-law-compliance-complexity-beyond-human-capacity/. With 
respect to the complexity of the United States Tax Code and the measurement of the complexity of 
laws more generally, see J.B. Ruhl and Daniel Martin Katz, “Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing 
Legal Complexity,” Iowa Law Review 101 (2015): 191-244, 
https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/issues/volume-101-issue-1/ILR-101-1-RuhlKatz.pdf. 
19
 See, for example, Robert W. Gordon, “Lawyers, the Legal Profession & Access to Justice in the 
United States: A Brief History,” Dædalus 148 (2019): 177-89, 
https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/19_Winter_Daedalus_Gordon.pdf; 
Ian Weinstein, “Coordinating Access to Justice For Low- And Moderate Income People,” N.Y.U. 
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 20 (2017): 501-22, 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1893&context=faculty_scholarship; but 
also see Colleen F. Shanahan and Anna E. Carpenter, “Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality,” 




 Ilana Kowarski, “See the Price, Payoff of Law School Before Enrolling,” US News & World 
Report, March 21, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2018-03-21/understand-the-cost-payoff-of-law-school-before-getting-a-jd; “What Are 
the Priciest Private Law Schools?” US News & World Report, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/private-cost-rankings; “What Are the Priciest Public Law Schools? 
US News & World Report, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/public-cost-rankings. 
21
 Andrew M. Perlman, “The Public’s Unmet Need for Legal Services & What Law Schools Can Do 
about It,” Dædalus 148 (2019): 75-81, 
https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/19_Winter_Daedalus_Perlman.pdf; 
Kellye Testy, “You Say ‘Disruption,’ I Say ‘JUST Disruption,’” Law School Admission Council, 
Nov. 29, 2018, https://www.lsac.org/blog/you-say-disruption-i-say-just-disruption. 
7 
 
source as well as automation and other technology with respect to the dissemination 




As Rebecca Sandefur has observed, justice is not about legal services, it is about 
“just resolution.”23 Sandefur rightfully points out that resolving what she terms a 
“justice problem” (as opposed to the more narrow term “legal need”) does not 
always require the assistance of a lawyer. Instead, there is a wider range of options 
and solutions require a new understanding of the problem: “It requires lawyers to 
work with problem solvers in other disciplines and with other members of the 
American public.”24 
 
The solutions I propose fit squarely in this optic. My solutions start from the 
understanding that legal services are (or, at least, they can be) something much larger 
than just what lawyers do (or, at least, what lawyers do traditionally) and my 
solutions include the provision of those services by persons and by structures other 
than lawyers and law firms. And more than that, they call not only for lawyers to 
work with a wider variety of persons and expertise, but also—going further—for 
lawyers and especially lawyer representative bodies to be displaced from their 
position of power over the regulation of legal services in favour of regulating bodies 
that encompass a wider range of expertise and the public itself. Few professions have 
a monopoly on regulatory and educational rules; lawyers are relatively unusual in 
this regard, as discussed below. Sandefur’s call for a wider perspective on how 
“justice problems” can be addressed and, indeed, her call for justice by “just 
resolution” cannot be accomplished in the absence of these steps.  
 
                                                          
22
 Robert Ambrogi, “The Innovation Gap (Part 2): How To Reboot The Justice System On 
Technology,” Above the Law, Jan. 29, 2018, https://abovethelaw.com/2018/01/the-innovation-gap-
part-2-how-to-reboot-the-justice-system-on-technology/; Anjanette H. Raymond and Scott J. 
Shackelford, “Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm be Deciding Your 
Case? Michigan Journal of International Law 35 (2014): 485-524, 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=mjil; Colin Lachance, 
“CanLII’s Future as a Canadian Primary Law Cooperative,” Slaw, Dec. 10, 2018, 
http://www.slaw.ca/2018/12/10/canliis-future-as-a-canadian-primary-law-cooperative/. But see also 
see Tanina Rostain, “Techno-Optimism & Access to the Legal System,” Dædalus 148 (2019): 93-97, 
https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/19_Winter_Daedalus_Rostain.pdf. 
23







The United States cannot address its access to justice crisis in the absence of the 
solutions I propose. They are necessary steps even if, by themselves, they will not be 
sufficient. 
 
IV. Critical Reflections 
When I began my study, my intended scope was much smaller. Indeed, it was so 
small that I didn’t realize that I was beginning a study. All I knew was that I had 
been introduced to how England & Wales had changed its rules to allow for a greater 





A. Overcoming Scepticism and Reluctance 
At first I was highly sceptical that the changes in England & Wales described to me 
did, in fact occur—the change were so far from my realm of understanding of how 
legal services could be provided and so seemingly antithetical to everything I had 
been taught about how legal services should be regulated that it was very difficult for 
me to accept them on an intellectual level. But eventually I did accept them, and as 
soon as I did I was able to imagine an entirely new world for legal services. Whereas 
before I had only seen limitations, they disappeared to be replaced by seemingly 
infinite possibilities for how legal services could be delivered in ways that were new, 
different, better. As I explain in the Preface of Democratizing, if in my life I have 




I set out to learn as much as I could about the new legal world in England & Wales: I 
read as much as I could and I made several trips from my home in France to London 
in order to attend classes to learn more. The classes I attended were designed as 
continuing legal education classes for solicitors; they offered a highly practical 
perspective on the functioning of the new legal world (COLPs and COFAs, material 
breaches, insurance, outcomes-focused regulation, qualified to supervise,…).27 
 
                                                          
25




 Ibid., ix-x. 
9 
 
At about this time I also journeyed to New York City in order to attend a Reinvent 
Law conference.
28
 It was on that occasion that I met the Editor of the ABA Journal. 
After a lengthy discussion about the changes in England & Wales and in particular 
about alternative business structures he invited me to submit an article for the ABA 
Journal. I did so,
29
 and this led to an invitation by ABA Publishing to submit a 
manuscript for a book on the adoption of alternative structures in England & Wales 




The preliminary manuscript that I prepared was focused upon the rules themselves 
—upon the new rules adopted in England & Wales and how those new rules can be 
used to inspire comparable rule changes in the United States; that is, the manuscript 
was focused exclusively on Solution Level N° 1 described above. Notably, the 
manuscript did not address the regulatory role of the ABA in any meaningful way. 
 
I solicited informal feedback on the preliminary manuscript from a number of 
persons. One challenged me on my failure to address the regulatory role of the ABA 
by referencing a then recently published article by Laurel Terry in which she 
describes the ABA as wearing two “hats,” one “trade group” or “representational” 
and the other “quasi-regulator.”31 For this reviewer, my analysis was incomplete 
without referencing this article and more fully addressing the regulatory role played 
by the ABA. 
 
This reviewer’s challenge set me on a journey that neither I nor, I have to presume, 
the reviewer, imagined.  
 
As a first step, I had to learn more about the regulatory role played by the ABA. 
Until that point I had been reluctant to do that. This was in part out of laziness—I 
anticipated that it would require a significant amount of work—and in part out of a 
                                                          
28
 “Reinvent Law NYC,” Feb. 7, 2014, https://cooper.edu/events-and-exhibitions/events/reinvent-law-
nyc. 
29
 Snyder, Laura, “Does the UK Know Something We Don't About Alternative Business Structures?” 




 Democratizing, x-xi. 
31
 Terry, “Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20,” 117-23. 
10 
 
belief that it was not sufficiently relevant to my principal focus on substantive rule 
changes.  
 
Motivated by the reviewer’s challenge, I overcame that reluctance in order to 
examine in detail the ABA’s governing bodies and how they function internally32 as 
well as in relation to local bar associations and the state regulators.
33
 I examined in 
even greater detail—going back to 1982—the four ABA commissions that have 




Those examinations turned out to be a big eye-opener for me. They forced me to 
confront the depth of the corruption in the regulation of legal services in the United 
States. With the word “corruption” I do not mean something as formulaic and 
obvious as the payment of bribes. I mean something more harmful and obscure that 
subverts the purpose of the regulation
35
 by operating to protect the legal profession at 
the expense of those who need legal services and the public at large. Indeed, it 
operates to protect not all members of the legal profession but those who are served 
by the continuation of the status quo—that is, those whose own interests and/or those 
of their powerful clients are protected by the many restrictions in place today both on 





The problematic nature of the ABA’s regulatory role also became apparent by 
comparing it to the regulatory roles of comparable bodies in the other countries: I 
saw that England & Wales and Australia were able to adopt revolutionary regulatory 
changes in large part because the regulatory roles of their respective law societies 
                                                          
32
 Democratizing, xxii, 20-21, 212-13; Modernizing, 159. 
33
 Democratizing, 19-21, 28-30, 199-206, 212-13; Modernizing, 208-11. 
34
 Democratizing, xxii-xxiv, 21-25, 205-206; Modernizing,171-234 . 
35
 Chapter 2 of Modernizing addresses the purpose of the regulation of legal services. Modernizing, 
17-18. 
36
 My interview with John Ray provides fascinating insight in this regard. “John Ray, Senior 
Consultant, Law Firm Consulting Group,” http://notjustforlawyers.com/john-ray/. See also 
Democratizing, 31. See also Deborah L. Rhode and Alice Woolley, “Comparative Perspectives on 
Lawyer Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada,” Fordham Law Review 
80 (2012): 2761-2790, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4808&context=flr, 
discussing how disciplinary sanctions brought by bar authorities tend to disproportionately target 
lawyers who, as sole practitioners or members of small firms, are “at the margins of the profession in 





 In contrast, while Canada’s semi-professionalized regulatory 
bodies have succeeded in adopting some meaningful changes their progress has been 




B. An Initially Narrow Focus, Progressively (and Perilously)  Enlarged 
It became clear to me that I was wrong to think that the regulatory role played by the 
ABA was not relevant to my work. I realized that, to the contrary, it is directly and 
highly relevant because the rule changes for which I advocate are impossible without 
also changing who has the power to make those rules—that is, without also changing 
the regulatory role played by the ABA. 
 
This analysis created a dilemma for me. My publisher wasn’t just any publisher: it 
was ABA Publishing. If I did incorporate this analysis—if I criticized the ABA’s 
regulatory role and advocated for limiting it in a manner akin to England & Wales 
and Australia—then I ran the risk that ABA Publishing would reject the manuscript 
for publication. But if I failed to incorporate this analysis then my manuscript not 
only would be incomplete but also, in my eyes, would lack integrity.  
 
For better or for worse, I chose the former, submitting a manuscript that addressed 
Solution Level N° 1 as well as Solution Level N° 2 described above. And ABA 




This rejection did more than just oblige me to find a different publisher; it also held 
two important lessons for me. Most obviously, it validated my observation that the 
rules cannot be changed without also changing who has the power to make the rules. 
The rejection of my manuscript taught me first-hand that for the ABA certain 
discussions are off-limits. But in that case, how can the best regulatory solutions be 
found? 
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My second lesson from this experience was less obvious but arguably even more 
important. The experience taught me that there is an additional question that must be 
asked: how do you change who has the power to make the rules, in order to finally 
be able to change the rules themselves? In order to answer this question I took an 
additional step back to examine: what is it about the entire regulatory environment of 
a country that either enables it to make or prevents it from making needed regulatory 
changes, be those changes to the rules themselves and/or changes to who has the 
power to make the rules? More specifically, why were England & Wales and 
Australia able to make sweeping changes while Canada is only able to make limited 
changes and the United States is stopped dead in its tracks?   
 
It was in answering these questions that I added Solution Level N° 3 (described 
above) to my again revised and expanded manuscripts—one book had grown into 
two—that were ultimately published by Lexington Books. 
 
In sum, Democratizing and Modernizing are the products of a mostly unplanned and 
unexpectedly perilous journey. I started with what I now realize was an overly 
narrow focus on rules themselves. I was at first reluctant to enlarge that focus but 
eventually I did so—progressively and ultimately enthusiastically—-as I grew to 
understand the fundamental connection between the quality of a country’s rules, the 
quality of its regulators, and the quality of its overall regulatory environment. I 
learned that good rules and good regulators are possible only in the context of a good 
regulatory environment. 
 
C. Paradigm of Neoliberalism 
My entire study was performed squarely within the paradigm of neoliberalism in that 
it does not question in any manner the use of market-based solutions (the purchase of 
legal services) to address social problems (access to justice and rule of law).
40
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However, it is not at all clear that market-based solutions are the best solutions for 
addressing access to justice and rule of law issues.
41
 And certainly they are not the 
only solutions. Conducting my study helped me to better understand the potential 
value of a program akin to the UK’s National Health Service, but for legal 
services—or, in the American parlance of “Medicare for All,” the potential value of 
a program of “legal services for all.” To apply the same justification as for a program 
of socialized medicine: everyone should have access to the legal services they need, 
when and where they need them, without suffering financial hardship.
42
 No one 
should be denied access to legal services because they are poor, and nor should 
anyone be poor because they are denied access to legal services.
43
 My study has 
prepared me, as a next step, to shed the neoliberal paradigm
44
 and to explore 
socialized legal services (and any other non-market-based solutions) in greater depth. 
 
V. Significance and Limitations of Study 
While my study is (A) significant for a number of reasons, it nevertheless (B) has 
some limitations.  
 
A. Significance of Study 
Democratizing argues that the problems that plague legal services in the United 
States cannot be addressed in the absence of a radical overhaul of the rules that 
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 Arguably I began this evolution in the last chapter of Modernizing, where I emphatically reject a 
proposal by Gillian Hadfield to introduce private markets for the purposes of regulation itself. 
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govern how legal services may be provided, and the book prepares the reader for a 
difficult journey by exposing the formidable obstacles that exist along the path to 
changing those rules. Modernizing explores the regulation of legal services in greater 
depth, in England & Wales, Australia, Canada and the US. In comparing the four 
jurisdictions, Modernizing exposes how the paralysis of the regulatory environment 
of the US prevents the country from closing its huge access to justice gap. Taken as a 
whole, these two books explain to the reader why the regulatory environment for 
legal services in the United States is moribund and the severe consequences this has 
for people who need legal services and who, in Sandefur’s parlance, need “just 
resolution.” At the same time, the books offer the reader a blueprint for how the 
United States can breathe new life into its regulatory environment for legal services 
and, in doing so, take a vital step towards restoring access to justice and, indeed, the 
rule of law and democracy itself.  
 
B. Limitations of Study 
While my study has a number of limitations I consider these three to be 
among the most significant: 
 
1. Almost No Interviews of People Who Need or Use Legal Services 
For the most part, I did not interview people who need or use legal services. The 
only exception to this is my discussion with Elizabeth Davies, who spoke with me in 
her capacity as Chair of the Legal Services Consumer Panel. In that position, her role 
is to represent “consumers” of legal services. In addition, while I did not interview 
him, Tom Gordon of Responsive Law reviewed an early draft manuscript and 
provided valuable feedback on it.  
 
I did not interview people who need or use legal services because I believed that, 
acting alone, I did not have the skills or resources required to do so effectively. 
Speaking with industry “players”—persons who have created and/or are managing 
alternative structures and regulators of legal services—is relatively easy in that for 
the most part they are well-versed in the underlying issues and are used to discussing 
them. Further, it was easy to identify the industry players who were relevant to my 
study and easy to contact them to ask them to participate: as industry players, 
15 
 
information about them and their activities is widely available on the internet. In 
most cases their contact details were also easily available. None of this is true with 
persons who need or use legal services: With the exception of, perhaps, some in-
house counsel, their familiarity with the issues and ease in discussing them could not 
be assumed. Further, acting alone, I did not know how I could identify or reach out 
to appropriate interview subjects as persons who need or use legal services. Finally, 
even if I were to identify appropriate interview subjects and know how to contact 
them, I did not feel that I had the skills necessary to interview them: I did not have 
confidence in my abilities to acquire their trust or to know how to frame my 
questions in order to elicit relevant responses. Indeed, it was in recognizing these 
limitations in myself that I was able to better understand the value of organizations 
like the Legal Services Consumer Panel in England and Responsive Law in the 
United States: they are among the few organizations that are fully conversant in the 
underlying issues and can discuss them not from the perspective of a legal services 
provider or a regulator but of those who need and use legal services.
45
 That informed 
perspective is precious and, as I’ve discovered in my research, highly undervalued. 
 
The fact that I did not, for the most part, interview persons who need or use legal 
services meant that I made certain assumptions about them and notably about the 
struggles they face. I did not make these assumptions entirely in the dark however; 
they were at least partially informed in that I myself have been a recipient of legal 
services both as an individual and in my roles as in-house counsel, I have assisted 
family members and friends as recipients of legal services and, as a legal services 
provider myself, I have observed first-hand how my clients have obtained and used 
legal services. I was also informed and inspired by a wealth of others’ research into 
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2. Did Not Examine the Countries at the Top of the World Justice Project Rule 
of Law Index 
In my study I rely heavily upon the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index and in 
particular upon its Factor 7.1 (“People can access and afford civil justice”) to 
demonstrate that lack of access to civil justice is a very serious problem in the United 
States. I draw attention not only to the shockingly low rank of the United States for 
this Factor (96
th
 out of 113 countries) but also to how the United States compares 









 And of course I go even 
further—I engage in a detailed examination of the differences among the four 
countries with respect to the regulation of legal services.  
 
My study ignores the countries that rank the highest with respect to Factor 7.1; that 
is, my study ignores the countries in the world where citizens can best access and 
afford civil justice. The 12 countries that rank the highest in the 2017-18 Index are 
the Netherlands, Uruguay, Denmark, Antigua and Barbuda, Germany, Dominica, 
Barbados, Spain, New Zealand, Argentina, Norway, and Bulgaria.
48
 While some of 
these countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica and New Zealand) share 
a common law tradition with the United States, most do not. Common law or not, 
what are the secrets of those countries? Why do their populations have better access 
to civil justice not only as compared to the United States but also to the UK, 
Australia and Canada? How are legal services in those countries regulated and, in 
particular, are they regulated in the manner that, in Modernizing, I argue that they 
should be? I felt that without some familiarity with the legal systems of at least some 
of these countries and also some familiarity with at least some of their languages 
(Dutch, Danish, Spanish, German, Norwegian, Bulgarian,…), I was not in a position 
to be able to do the research necessary to respond to those questions. 
 
3. Lack of Data Demonstrating that the Changes in England & Wales and 
Australia Have Had (or Not) a Positive Effect on Access to Legal Services 
While, in contrast to the two limitations described above, I do not see this as 
reflection of any personal failing or lack of skill on my part, I do think it is 
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unfortunate that in my study I was not able to present any data demonstrating 
whether (or not) the regulatory changes in England & Wales and Australia have 
actually (or not) resulted in better access to legal services by the populations of those 
countries. While I can imagine that it would be quite difficult to devise much less 
carry out an appropriate and sufficiently comprehensive study
49
 I am nevertheless 
surprised as well as disappointed that, for England & Wales in particular, no such 
study exists (not that I am aware of, anyway) or has even been seriously attempted.  
 
It is important to stress, however, that even in spite of this absence of data I believe 
there exists proof that the changes have been beneficial.
50
 I believe this proof exists 
in the mere existence of the alternative structures I’ve profiled in my study: 
examined on a case-by-case basis, it is clear that they offer legal services in ways 
that were previously unavailable and to the extent these structures remain in business 
it is clear that there are people benefitting from their services. Further, and I believe 
that this is one of the most fundamental arguments reflected in the study, to the 
extent lawyers are provided by law with a monopoly on something as vital as legal 
services then they should be required to meet all needs for those services. If they are 
unable or unwilling to do so then they should not be allowed to maintain their 
monopoly. While certainly it is reasonable to require the others who would like to 
attempt to meet them comply with certain requirements intended to protect clients 
from poor or incompetent service, it is entirely unreasonable to require proof that 
they will succeed in significantly reducing unmet need. Of course this cannot be 
proven in advance and any requirement for such proof is a ruse for maintaining the 
monopoly, all while never requiring lawyers themselves—the monopoly holders—to 




VI. Relation of Findings to Existing Scholarship 
Scholarship in this area typically has one of two focuses: either (A) the concept of 
professionalism and its relationship to self-regulation, or (B) the regulatory changes 
that have taken or are in the process of taking place in England & Wales and 
Australia and their implications for regulation in the United States. In this next 
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section, I shall consider how the literature has approached these two concepts in a 
legal context, and then explain how my findings either advance or expand upon this 
scholarship.  
 
A. Professionalism and Self-Regulation 
The first area of focus relates to the concept of professionalism and its relationship to 
self-regulation. This existing scholarship centres on how a 19
th
 century concept of 
professionalism has collided with a 20
th
 century concept of capitalism. Under the 
little-changed concept of professionalism, the legal profession is perceived as a 
public good. In this context, protecting and strengthening the legal profession is 
perceived to bring benefit to the public. Protection—and thus also professionalism—
involves, most notably, self-regulation as well as broad unauthorized practice of law 
rules, strictly applied, to assure that anyone providing legal services falls under the 
control of that self-regulation.
52
 However, this concept of professionalism—and thus 
also protectionism—has proven difficult to reconcile with the requirements of 
modern capitalism, which compels lawyers to act as service providers, and thus to 




1. Existing Scholarship 
A number of scholars have examined this quandary in-depth. Notable examples 
include: 
 
Alan Paterson describes self-regulation as an element of a professionalism 
“contract.”54 More specifically, Paterson explains, the nature of professionalism, at 
least in its “traditional model,”55 is that it carries certain obligations for the 
profession in exchange for which it also provides to them certain benefits. The 
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obligations that it carries include competence (or expertise), a service ethic, public 
protection, and access. In counterpart, the profession is accorded status, “reasonable 
rewards,” restricted competition and autonomy (or self-regulation).56 Seen from this 
perspective, self-regulation is an integral if not essential element of what it means to 
exercise a profession. Put another way, for Paterson, without autonomy (or self-
regulation), there is no profession. 
 
Richard Abel takes a cynical, if not mercenary, twist on Paterson’s concept of the 
professionalism “contract.” For Abel, controlling the market is an essential element 
of professionalism and self-regulation is a key means of that control. More 
specifically, self-regulation allows the legal profession "to control the production of 
and by the producers.”57 This control includes both the supply side (who offers legal 
services and how they do so) as well as the demand side (how legal services may be 
advertised or solicited, and the extent to which pro bono work is encouraged).
58
 In 
the words of Abel, “from a structural perspective, a profession must seek to control 
its market or else commit collective suicide.”59 In sum, for Abel, even if self-
regulation does not enable the profession to achieve a perfect or total control over the 
market,
60
 it nevertheless enables it to achieve some, and for that reason self-
regulation is essential to the survival of the legal profession.  
 
Noel Semple rejects the theory of professionalism as a social contract, stating that its 
“elitism” is unsupportable.61 Further, it courts regulatory failure (the inability both to 
accomplish the goals of regulation and to prioritize client interests over lawyer 
interests),
62
 and it has deleterious effects upon access to justice (by increasing the 
                                                          
56
Paterson, Lawyers and the Public Good, 16; Paterson, “Professionalism and the Legal Services 
Market,” 140; Alan Paterson, Lindsay Farmer, Frank Stephen and James Love, “Competition and the 
Market for Legal Services,” Journal of Law and Society 15 (1988): 361. 
57
 Richard L. Abel, “Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?” Texas Law Review 59 (1981): 
653; see also Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 40-73, 
112-57; Richard L. Abel, “United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism,” in Lawyers in 
Society: The Common Law World, ed. Richard L. Abel and Philip S.C. Lewis (Washington DC: Beard 
Books, 2005), 205-22. 
58
 Abel, “Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?” 657-60. 
59
 Ibid., 654. 
60
 Abel says that the profession’s struggle for market control is “waged,” not that it is necessarily 
“won.” Ibid. 
61
 Noel Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads: Justitia's Legions (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 6-7, 216-17. 
62
 Ibid., 6, 93-132. 
20 
 
price and supressing intra-professional collaboration).
63
 However, Semple argues, as 
problematic as professionalism is, it should not be abandoned. Rather, it should be 
reformed and renewed in order to retain its positive aspects of service orientation, 




Laurel Rigertas writes that a key justification for regulating legal services is to 
protect consumers.
65
 But, she asks, how much are we really protecting them when 
our regulations make it impossible for them to access legal services and thus force 
them to go without?
 66
 For Rigertas, it is the responsibility of state courts, as “the 
main regulators of the legal profession,” to take on more of a leadership role. In 
particular, she calls upon state courts to “revisit the scope” of the legal profession’s 




Gillian Hadfield and Deborah Rhode observe that the US bar’s standard response to 
the crisis in access to justice is to promote increased funding for legal aid, increased 
pro bono by attorneys, and the creation of a government-funded right to counsel in 
some civil matters.
68
 But, the authors point out, these responses are nowhere near 
adequate.
69
 They argue that a larger number of people could be reached through the 
development of new business models, and notably through the “corporate practice of 
law,” but that such development is impossible in large part due to the protectionism 
of the bar. More specifically, they state, lawyers use their “special access to the 
regulatory levers” to protect themselves from competition by nonlawyers and 
alternative business models.
70
 In order to improve access, reduce costs, promote 
innovation and improve quality of legal services, Hadfield and Rhode recommend 
that regulation be changed in these ways: (1) to develop a licensing scheme under 
which entities (namely corporations) in addition to lawyer-only law firms are 
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authorized to provide legal services, (2) to allow lawyers to share revenue and profits 
with nonlawyers, (3) to expand the number and diversity of licensed legal 





James Moliterno argues that, in the United States, the legal profession’s inward 
focus, of which self-regulation is an integral part, causes the profession to resist 
change.
72
 Moliterno shows through a succession of examples how the profession 
changes only in the midst of a crisis and only when change is forced upon it from 
outside.
73
 As a result, the profession is unable to “grow with society” and is not 




2. My Findings in Relation to Existing Scholarship 
What is missing from the scholarship described above is an examination of the 
extent to which the entire regulatory framework for legal services in the United 
States may be limiting the profession’s ability to deliver on its obligations of 
professionalism. And more than that, the extent to which the regulatory framework 
may be holding back not just the legal profession but all of us, as a society, from 
assuring that those who need legal services receive them, be it from a lawyer or other 
competent source. These questions are particularly pertinent with respect to the 
United States, as that country has sat on the sidelines while other common law 
jurisdictions, and notably England & Wales and Australia, have made substantial if 
not revolutionary changes to their frameworks.  
 
How did those changes come about, to what extent have the changes resulted in 
better outcomes for those who need legal services, and what can the United States 
learn from those countries? My study responds to these as yet unanswered questions:  
 
a. How Did the Changes Come About? 
The changes came about by ignoring if not outright rejecting any conversation about 
professionalism and its focus on the legal profession in order to focus on the needs of 
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clients and of the public as a whole. Further, they were only possible once the 
spectre of self-regulation was overcome—and again its focus on the legal 
profession—so as to permit a focus on what is good regulation—regulation that 
would benefit the public.
75
 My interview data provided a rich vein of evidence in this 
regard, for example: 
“What matters is not what the impact of change will be on the ‘legal 
profession,’ but whether those changes will make it easier, in an inequitable 
world, for people to find access to the legal system.”—Andrew Grech, Group 




“When lawyers are self-regulating, their focus is rarely on access to justice or 
other consumer outcomes. Their focus is on whether services are being 
provided at a high enough standard…It is a professional conceit to believe that 





“The main focus of the Panel is to ensure that the reforms in the legal services 
market are producing better outcomes for consumers and to ensure that 
regulators are taking into account the use of legal services from the 
perspective of the consumers. We are trying to put the needs of consumers of 
legal services into the heart of the regulations.”—Elisabeth Davies, Chair, 




“We are focused on what is in the public interest. We do not think about what 
we are doing in terms of what is good for the legal profession—we do not want 
to harm the legal profession because it plays a key role in our society, but our 
focus is on change for the benefit of the public.”—Darrel Pink, Executive 
Director, Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society.79 
 
“Lawyers today struggle with the concepts of self-governance and the public 
interest. Since the 19th century, lawyers have taken for granted that self-
governance is in the public interest. I think we need to challenge that. We need 
to make sure that regulation is done through the lens of the public interest.”— 




These quotes demonstrate that in these jurisdictions the focus was much broader than 
professionalism as a product of self-regulation, but instead as a function of 
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addressing client needs and how better to achieve this through a regulatory 
environment that sought to increase access to legal services and to Sandefur’s “just 
resolutions.”81 
 
b. To What Extent Have the Changes Resulted in Better Outcomes for 
Those Who Need Legal Services? 
In making the changes it made, England & Wales and Australia now allow for a 
much wider range of persons and structures to provide legal services using a much 
wider variety of business models.
82
 That wide variety and how it makes it easier for 
different kinds of people to access legal services. I set out below a range of the types 
of legal service organisations that have flourished as a result of these regulatory 
changes, and how they are able to address access to justice through new and 
innovative means:   
 
Proelium Law is a two-partner multidisciplinary practice that offers legal and 
business advice to companies, individuals and governmental agencies that seek to 
operate in complex, high-risk and hostile environments such has Syria, Afghanistan 
and Iraq.
83
  As Adrian Powell, a founding partner of Proelium Law explained to me: 
For clients that operate in complex environments, it is easier for them to come 
to us rather than to a law firm that does not have any particular knowledge or 
understanding of complex environments or the client’s particular 
industry…There are very few firms in the world that do what we do... The fact 
that we can offer clients a one-stop-shop is comforting for them. Much more so 





This multi-disciplinary perspective was obvious in other legal service entities too. 
Salvos Legal is a not-for-profit law firm with eight “partners” that provides 
commercial and property services to corporations, government agencies and not-for-
profits. The fees collected by Salvos Legal, less expenses, are used to fund Salvos 
Legal Humanitarian. Salvos Legal Humanitarian is a full-service law firm that 
provides services to the “disadvantaged and marginalized” in family law, housing, 
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social security, migration and refugee matters, debt, criminal law and other areas. 
The services of Salvos Legal Humanitarian are offered free of charge; the firm has a 
staff of lawyers whose salaries are paid from the funding of Salvos.
85
 As Luke 
Geary, the Managing Partner of both Salvos Legal and Salvos Legal Humanitarian, 
explained to me:  
Salvos Legal Humanitarian, to date, has provided free legal assistance on 
[18,856]
86
 matters, at no cost either to the government or to The Salvation 
Army. That’s [18,856] cases of access to justice that otherwise would not exist. 




BPIF Legal offers legal support and advice to members of The British Printing 
Industries Federation (BPIF), a trade association representing the UK’s print, printed 
packaging and graphic communications industry. Their services are offered 
holistically with the other services that BPIF also offers to its members, in the areas 
of human resources, health, safety and environment, quality, marketing, sales and 
finance.
88
  As Anne Copley, Head of Legal, BPIF Legal, explained to me:  
Our members come to us because of our expertise in the industry. They do not 
have to explain to us how the industry works…  We know what our members 
are and we can ask questions that other lawyers might not know to ask because 
we know frontwards and backwards what goes on in a printing company. In 
addition, the relationship we have with our members is different than the one a 
traditional law firm would have with them. For lack of a better word, the 
relationship is more intimate. Since they are members, they consider that they 
have some ownership of us, rather than coming to us cap in hand. And since 
we liaise with the other services in our organization, we have a much more 




Yet more evidence of multi-disciplinary practice is found in Counterculture 
Partnership that offers to cultural and creative not-for-profit organizations holistic 
services in the areas of strategic planning, funding, financial and project 
management, legal and governance advice, capital projects, training and advocacy. 
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Counterculture has ten partners of which one is a lawyer.
90
 As Keith Arrowsmith, 
Partner, Counterculture Partnership LLP, explained to me:  
There are clients who talk to me now because I am sitting with them wearing a 
Counterculture badge that wouldn’t dream of walking through the door of 
what they see as a law firm. There is something about the perception of being 
in this more comprehensive structure that allows them to be more comfortable 
in engaging with me. Some of it might be related to concerns about cost, but I 
think that the real reason is that because I am wearing a Counterculture 
badge, I can begin conversations that otherwise I never would have been able 
to have. Many people in the arts start with the premise that their world and the 
legal world are so far apart, a lawyer could never understand them. With 
Counterculture, I am able to communicate with clients in a much more open 
way because they don’t see us as a traditional law firm. We’ve had real 




But it is not just multi-disciplinary practice that is possible under these alternative 
regulatory models. New forms of business investment and firm ownership are also 
permitted, allowing firms to harness a range of people with a diversity of talents. For 
example, Stephens Scown provides legal services to companies and high net worth 
individuals. The firm specializes in areas important to the South West region of 
England, such as mining & minerals, renewable energy and tourism. Inspired by the 
share ownership scheme of John Lewis, Stephens Scown is one of the first large law 
firms in the UK to implement a limited employee share ownership scheme in which 
not just lawyers but all eligible employees may participate.
92
 As Robert Camp, 
Managing Partner, Stephens Scown LLP, explained to me:  
For the past five years, we’ve been focused on client service, and we’ve won 
several awards for client service. We’ve recognized that client service is 
dependent upon staff engagement, and we want our staff to feel part of our 
firm, and not just a cog in a bigger wheel. This is the context in which we 
decided to become an ABS [alternative business structure] — in order to 
increase staff engagement. Research shows that if you can engage your entire 
staff so that they are all working for the same common goal and not just for 
rewards for those at the top, then the quality of service will go up. So you get 




In short, changes to the regulatory environment have allowed the development of 
alternative business structures that provide a more extensive and also specialised set 
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of services at more competitive prices to individuals and to small and medium sized 
businesses. And the fact that non-lawyers are able to become legal business owners 
has brought new thinking into the legal services market and challenged some of the 
orthodoxies about how to practice law. The results have been very positive for 
clients. 
 
c. What Can the United States Learn? 
The list of what the United States can learn from England & Wales and Australia as 
well as from Canada is long. Without any pretence of this list being comprehensive, 
the United States can learn (1) that allowing for a wider range of persons and 
structures to provide legal services need not and has not resulted in unethical or sub-
standard legal services nor has it resulted in the end of the legal profession,
94
 (2) that 
while of course members of the legal profession should be involved in discussions of 
whether and how to change the rules they should not control those discussions and 
many more different kinds of persons—representatives of the public as well as those 
who have expertise in areas other than the legal profession—need to be involved in 
the discussions,
95
 and (3) that it will not be enough to make small changes to one or 
a handful of rules: it is necessary to change the entire regulatory environment for 




A number of the persons I interviewed echoed these lessons: 
“[Lord Falconer selected me in part because] I was not a lawyer…In 
approaching the task, the first thing I did was to ask what questions needed to 
be answered. I concluded that [one question was]: What would be a better 
regulatory system than the confusion we have now?”—David Clementi, 




“As we watched what was happening [in England & Wales and Australia] we 
realized that the sky hasn’t fallen, and that it likely won’t fall. We also realized 
that what they were doing made a lot of sense. And we realized that the 
practice of law has changed substantially…All this led us … to ask the 
question: What is the right regulatory model for the 21st century?”—Darrel 
Pink, Executive Director, Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society.98 
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“A body that is essentially a membership body will always find it difficult if not 
impossible to take regulatory action which its members perceive to be a threat 
to their livelihoods, no matter how great the benefit to the public may be. This 
is why we need independent regulators, as they are able to regulate in the 
interest of the public without any conflict of interest with a duty to represent 
members. And with independent regulation, I am not saying that the 
perspective of the public or of the consumer must or even should prevail—I am 
simply saying that it needs to be in the mix. It’s essential for instilling public 
confidence in lawyers as well as in the regulation of legal services, and for 
that matter in our system of justice and the rule of law.”—John Briton, former 




“When I look at the work of the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) in 
England & Wales, I see that they spend a lot of time assessing risks and 
identifying ways to reduce those risks and to improve client services. Here in 
Colorado we do not have the resources of the SRA, but I think there is still a 
lot we can do. This is especially the case if we use the English and Australian 





In short, regulatory change can be creative, effective and liberating for legal 
professions and for the public, assuming it is done in the right way. 
 
B. Regulatory Changes in England & Wales, Australia, and Canada 
The second area of focus relates to the regulatory changes that have taken or are in 
the process of taking place in England & Wales, Australia, and Canada, and their 
implications for regulation in the United States. The existing scholarship in this area 
centres heavily upon England & Wales, and, in particular, upon the adoption of the 
2007 Legal Services Act (“Legal Services Act”),101 as well as upon Australia. This 
scholarship describes in greater or lesser detail the events leading up to the adoption 
of new regulations in those countries, the content of the new regulations, and the 
manner by which the new regulations have been interpreted and applied. In most 
cases this scholarship does not address the regulatory changes from a wide context 
but instead from a narrow one, notably by focusing on one element in particular, 
such as self-regulation, alternative structures, entity regulation, (with or without) 
compliance-based regulation, or regulatory objectives. 
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1. Existing Scholarship 
The literature provides a lens through which we are able to view legal service 
regulatory change and the drivers for change in the jurisdictions that I compared with 
the United States’ context.  
 
Paul Paton describes the changes in England & Wales and Australia as having been 
motivated in large part by widely publicized scandals resulting from the failure of 
the bar in each country to effectively regulate its members.
102
 These scandals, 
together with concerns regarding competition and consumer welfare, led to changes 
in the regulatory system of each country whereby the profession lost regulatory 
power. In England & Wales, under the Legal Services Act and its creation of the 
Legal Services Board, this loss was nearly complete.
103
 In Australia, however, it was 
merely partial as in most states the profession now acts as a co-regulator alongside 
that state’s Legal Services Commissioner (or comparable body).104 For Paton, the 
experiences of England & Wales and Australia are warning signs to the Canadian 
and American bars which, Paton assumes, would like to maintain their self-
regulatory powers. He warns, however, that if the bar of either country fails to 
protect the public interest or confuses the public interest with the self-interest of the 




Richard Devlin and Ora Morison describe in considerable detail the events that led to 
the adoption of incorporated legal practices in Australia and ABSs in England & 
Wales.
106
 They also examine the events that led to the failure of the adoption of 
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alternative structures in the United States.
107
 Their descriptions centre upon the 
respective roles of four “constituencies” in the debate on whether ABSs are 
desirable: governments, the organized legal professions, corporations, and consumer 
groups.
108
 Observing that government played an important role in England & Wales 
and in Australia but virtually no role in the United States, they conclude that “the 
most assured route” to the introduction of ABSs in Canada will require government 
support. In its absence, the initiative will fall upon the law societies of the provinces 




Adam Dodek argues that Canada should regulate law firms in addition to lawyers as 
individuals. Dodek supports this argumentation in part by looking to England & 
Wales and Australia as examples. For this purpose, he describes the adoption of 
entity-based regulation in England & Wales (with limited detail)
110
 together with the 
adoption of compliance-based regulation in Australia (with significant detail).
111
 
Dodek concludes that the regulation of law firms is necessary in order to ensure 
public confidence in self-regulation and out of respect for the rule of law. For him, 
the proper question is not whether law firms should be regulated, but instead why do 




Ted Schneyer and Susan Fortney, respectively, recount the events leading to 
Australia’s adoption of compliance-based regulation (which they refer to as 
proactive, management-based regulation, or PMBR).
113
 Both Schneyer and Fortney 
cite 2010 research by Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon and Steve Mark 
demonstrating that the adoption of PMBR led to a two-thirds drop in the number of 
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complaints against law firms in Australia.
114
 On the basis of this research, both 
Schneyer and Fortney argue that the United States should adopt PMBR because it 
will improve the quality of legal services and the operation of law firms and will 
increase client satisfaction.
115 In making this recommendation, Schneyer and Forney, 
respectively, focus in particular upon the self-assessment requirement adopted in 
Australia. In their opinions, the simple process of completing the self-assessment 
results in law firms making “learning and infrastructural adaptations”116 which 
address in a proactive manner the types of concerns that typically lead to 
complaints.
117
 This, in turn, leads to fewer complaints and better quality client 
service. 
 
Laurel Terry, Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon argue that “regulatory objectives are a 
necessity and jurisdictions that have not adopted regulatory objectives should 
seriously consider doing so.”118 They offer England & Wales as an example of a 
jurisdiction that has adopted regulatory objectives, and, in doing so, they provide a 
history of the adoption of the Legal Services Act with a specific focus upon the topic 
of regulatory objectives.
119
 Terry, Mark and Gordon argue that regulatory objectives 
serve important purposes, not the least of which are informing the public, consumers 
of legal services, and the profession of the purpose of legal services regulation, and 




2. My Findings in Relation to Existing Scholarship 
What is missing from this scholarship is a comprehensive examination of the 
regulatory changes in England & Wales and Australia. More specifically, what is 
missing is an exposure of the interplay among each of the different changes that, in 
the scholarship described above, are considered mostly in isolation from each other. 
In fact, neither England & Wales nor Australia adopted any of those changes in 
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isolation from the others. To the contrary, each change was highly dependent upon 
the other changes and each was adopted in the context of an overhaul of the 
respective country’s entire regulatory framework. These facts are highly pertinent 
with respect to the United States because its attempts to adopt alternative 
structures—in isolation of other changes—have failed. My study demonstrates why 
this is the case.
121
 My study also further completes existing scholarship with updated 
information both as regards the adoption of the Legal Profession Uniform Law in 
Australia
122





a. Why Attempts in the United States to Adopt Alternative Structures Have 
Failed 
In the United States, the objections raised in relation to the adoption of alternative 
structures have often included “There is no way to regulate them.”124 Indeed, there 
currently is no way to regulate them because today in the United States legal services 
are not regulated directly: they are regulated only indirectly, through the regulation 
of lawyers as individuals. Law firms (which can only be made up of lawyers) are 
regulated only in very limited ways,
125
 and any person that is not a lawyer is not 
regulated at all, except through the lawyer monopoly on legal services, which for the 
most part restricts anyone who is not a lawyer from providing legal services.
126
 Thus, 
indeed, it simply would not be sufficient to amend ABA Model Rule 5.4 to allow for 
alternative structures: the entire regulatory framework for legal services will also 
need to be revised in order to allow for the regulation not just of lawyers but of all 
legal services, regardless of the person or the structure that provides them. 
As noted above, nothing in the existing scholarship acknowledges or addresses the 
necessity of this preliminary (or at least simultaneous) step. But for the regulators in 
the other countries I studied—who started from more or less the same position as the 
United States in that they also only regulated lawyers as individuals—this necessity 
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was obvious and easily recognized. Neither Clementi’s role nor his objectives were 
limited to allowing for alternative structures. Instead, his role was to identify “a 
better regulatory system,” and a primary objective was to “remove barriers to 
competition.”127 Allowing for alternative structures was a by-product among many 
other by-products of that process. Similarly, even if as Legal Services Commissioner 
for New South Wales Steve Mark initially resisted,
128
 he eventually embraced his 
role, commenting with Tahlia Gordon: 
  The 2001 legislation permitting law firms to incorporate not only changed 
law firm structure. It also changed the method of regulation…The 
introduction of entity regulation today means that we have shifted from 
regulating “lawyers” to regulating “legal work”…At the beginning we faced 
a lot of criticism. But we didn’t let that stop us.129  
 
In a jointly written paper, the Law Societies of the Prairie Provinces of Manitoba, 
Alberta and Saskatchewan explained that while their initial focus was on alternative 
structures, they realized over the course of their discussions that “it was impractical 
to look at ABS alone” because of uncertainty over how they could be regulated. This 
led them to the inevitable conclusion that entity regulation, compliance-based 
regulation and alternative structures “are all intimately connected.” Entity regulation, 
together with compliance-based regulation, are the answer to the question “how 
would we regulate ABS?”130 In stark contrast, when Ontario tried to change its rules 
only in order to allow for alternative structures of some kind—in isolation from any 
other regulatory change—my study explains how this resulted in a spectacular 
failure.
131
 Given the importance of that province for the country as a whole, 
Ontario’s failure has set the work in Canada back for a number of years at least.132 
 
b. Completion of Existing Scholarship 
As explained above, while fragmented, existing scholarship describes in greater or 
lesser detail the changes that took place in England & Wales in connection with the 
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2007 Legal Services Act and in Australia in connection with the progressive changes 
that took place in New South Wales in the 1990s and early 2000s and were adopted 
across most of Australia with the Model Laws Project. My study adds to this 
scholarship not only by collecting the fragments in order to understand it as a 
whole,
133
 but also by explaining in a comprehensive manner the adoption, content 
and significance of the 2015 Legal Profession Uniform Law in Australia
134
 and the 





It is with this information that we can have as complete an understanding as possible 
of what happened and is happening in England & Wales, Australia and Canada. In 
this manner, the United States may fully learn from what those countries have done 
right as well as from what they have done wrong. This learning is vital if the United 
States is to overcome the formidable obstacles it faces on its path to reform of legal 
services regulation. And, as explained above, such reform is vital if the United States 
is to assure wider access to legal services and, in doing so, better assure access to 
justice and the rule of law. 
 
VII. Original Contribution to Knowledge 
Taking the material as a whole (Democratizing, Modernizing and the online data), 
the most important contribution is its very different perspective on the regulation of 
legal services. Most analyses of lawyer regulation are made from the perspective of 
lawyers and the legal profession. In contrast, the material analyses lawyer regulation 
from the perspective of prospective users of legal services and the public as a whole. 
This different perspective changes the discourse: The conversation is no longer about 
the nature of professionalism or whether law is a profession or a business. Instead, it 
is about the problems that people have in accessing legal services and about what 
stands in their way. The conversation is no longer about whether the legal profession 
has or should have a monopoly on legal services, but instead on how should legal 
services be regulated so as to permit unmet need to be fulfilled effectively.  
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Changing the discourse in this manner has profound consequences. It enables us to 
understand that what have typically been thought of as separate and distinct issues 
are in fact closely linked and highly dependent upon each other: the rule of law, 
access to justice and equal protection of the law, innovation in legal services, and the 
regulation of legal services. It enables us to understand that innovation in legal 
services should not be an end in itself or a means to maximize profits, but a means to 
maximize access to justice and rule of law. It enables us to understand that the focus 
of regulation needs to be on how to increase access to justice and the rule of law, 
even if this may be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as detrimental to the legal 
profession. While we should not seek to harm the profession, our focus should be 




The second original contribution is its comparison of the common law jurisdictions 
of England & Wales, Australia, Canada and the United States. The material offers a 
comprehensive and in-depth comparison of the manner by which each jurisdiction 
has addressed or is addressing the topic of alternative structures. This comparison 
exposes not only the fundamental differences in the way each jurisdiction has 
addressed this specific topic, but also the fundamental differences in each 
jurisdiction’s overall regulatory environments. This dual exposure enables us to 
understand why England & Wales and Australia have succeeded whereas Canada is 
struggling and the United States has to date outright failed in adopting alternative 
structures. And, most importantly, it allows us to understand how the United States 
can learn from the experiences of its common law sisters in order to improve 
(indeed, bring back to life) its today moribund regulatory environment for legal 
services. 
 
The interviews offer two original contributions of their own: Firstly, they provide 
direct, first-hand perspectives on the variety of issues that are raised in the books. 
They move the discussion of alternative structures as well as a new regulatory 
environment from the realm of the theoretical and abstract to the realm of the 
concrete and entirely real.  
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Secondly, the interviews demonstrate the full range of alternative structures that have 
been created in England & Wales and Australia. Many people think that alternative 
structures are only about large corporations establishing “law factories,” in the 
manner of Slater & Gordon. Certainly they are about that, but they are also about 
much more. There is huge variety in these structures, as regards both size and 
substance that many people overlook. Part VI.A.2.b above provides five examples 
drawn from the interviews: Proelium Law, Salvos Legal and Salvos Legal 
Humanitarian, BPIF Legal, Counterculture Partnership, and Stephens Scown. These 
five structures, as well as the others that are profiled in the interviews, demonstrate 
just some of the large variety of ways that legal services are provided under the new 
regulatory frameworks of England & Wales and of Australia. They demonstrate just 
some of the large variety of ways that, regulatory framework permitting, individuals 
as well as organizations that need legal services can be reached and served. None of 
these structures is permitted under the regulatory frameworks currently in place in 










Publications: Two books: (1) Democratizing Legal Services: Obstacles and 
Opportunities (2016
137
), and (2) Modernizing Legal Services in Common Law 
Countries: Will the US Be Left Behind? (2017
138
). The publisher for both is 
Lexington Books, an imprint of Rowman & Littlefield. A hard copy of each book is 
submitted together with this Commentary. An electronic version of each book has 
been uploaded to VRE. The books are supplemented by additional online data that is 
available in open access via a website at this link. Additionally, a 275-page pdf 
document containing all of the supplemental materials is available at this link. 
 
Demonstration of appropriate quality: Both books were prepared on the basis of 
extensive research of both primary and secondary materials. In conducting the study 
I consulted with and incorporated the input of a number of scholars based in the US, 
UK, Canada and Australia. Both books were the subject of anonymous peer review. 
The supplemental online data is the work-product of 65 oral interviews that I 
conducted over a 27-month period. The methodology used to conduct the interviews 
and prepare the supplemental data is described below in Appendix B. 
 
The full bibliography for Democratizing is available at this link and the full 
bibliography for Modernizing is available at this link. The full bibliography for 
Democratizing is also available with Zotero at this link. 
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Methodology for the Interviews 
 I conducted the interviews either by phone or skype, with one exception (Sir David 
Clementi, with whom I met in person). Most interviews lasted about one hour. A 
small number were shorter—about 30 minutes—and some were much longer—up to 
two hours, with some of those taking place over more than one call. When I 
conducted the first interviews in early 2014, I had no idea what I was doing: I was 
not sure what questions to ask, I was not sure in what order to ask them, and I was 
not adept at formulating follow-up questions. After the first few interviews, I got the 
hang of it. The interviews became semi-structured, with the support of a topic guide.  
 
More specifically, I developed a core set of questions. Before each interview, I 
studied the publicly available information about the relevant organization and the 
interviewee, and tailored the core set of questions to reflect the specificities of both. 
As I listened to each interviewee, I got into the habit of noting follow-up questions 
and I got better at identifying the right moments to ask them. Because I was never 
sure that I asked all the right questions, my last question became “What should I 
have asked, but didn’t?” Often it was this question that elicited the most interesting 
comments.  
 
I consulted with Professor Lisa Webley, now my Director of Studies, in order to 
verify that my approach conformed to university research ethics requirements. She 
was able to confirm that it did. 
 
In most instances, the interviews were recorded with the permission of the 
interviewee, and I also took handwritten notes as needed. After each interview, I 
prepared a write-up. I quickly recognized that a simple transcript of the interview 
wouldn’t work: hearing the spoken word is one thing—reading the spoken word is 
something entirely different. Run-on sentences, sentence fragments and the 
repetition of words and ideas are tolerated and even expected in speech, but not in 
writing. So, what I did was take the words and ideas that the interviewee expressed 
orally, and organized them on paper (or, more precisely, on a screen) in way that 
38 
 
they could be easily accessed by a reader rather than a listener. Because I wanted the 
focus of the reader to be on the interviewee and not on the interviewer (me), I 
excluded from the write-up the questions that I posed and any other limited 
commentary I occasionally made during the interviews. An unfortunate by-product 
of this is that sometimes in reading the stories the transitions can be abrupt. 
 
I sent each write-up back to the interviewee. In doing so, I invited him/her to make 
comments and corrections. At first, I was not sure how “warmly” I should extend 
this invitation. Naturally I wanted any factual errors to be corrected. More than that, 
I wanted the interviewee to be comfortable with the write-up. At the same time, 
however, I didn’t want the write-up to be transformed into something that no longer 
reflected the interview. In progressing with the first few write-ups, I discovered that 
those fears were mostly unfounded—most interviewees made very few if any 
substantive changes. And when substantive changes were made, in most cases I felt 
that they improved the write-up. So, after those first few write-ups, I became 
comfortable extending what I intended to be a warm invitation to make comments 
and corrections, saying “please don’t feel wedded to what I have typed” and “it is 
important that you are comfortable.” And when I received a write-up back, usually in 
the form of a mark-up, I did not question or quibble with the changes—instead, in 
nearly all cases I accepted all of them, and then went back through the revised 
document simply to correct any spelling or grammatical errors.  
 
As noted above, the interviews were conducted between March 2014 and May 2016. 
In August 2015 I contacted everyone I had interviewed up to that time, and I invited 
them to work with me to update their write-ups—most of them did so, if not 
immediately, then over the course of the following months.  
 
Finally, because of spacing concerns, it was impossible to include all of the 
interviews in the books. The interviews that are included are excerpts. As previously 
noted, full versions of all the interviews can be accessed at 






A variety of terms are used to refer to organizations that are owned and/or managed 
by one or more nonlawyers and/or that are multidisciplinary practices (in other 
words, to refer to legal service providers that are not the traditional structures of 
either sole practitioner or law firm partnership). In Australia as well as in England & 
Wales, where there exist formal regulatory frameworks for such organizations, the 
terminology is fixed and easy to identify: in Australia they are referred to as 
“incorporated legal practices” or “ILPs” (as well as “multi-disciplinary 
partnerships,” or “MDPs” and the recently coined “unincorporated legal practices,” 
or “ULPs”). In England & Wales, they are referred to in common speech as 
“alternative business structures” or “ABSs,” and in the formal legal texts as 
“licensed bodies.” In the Canadian provinces, which are moving towards formal 
regulatory frameworks for such organizations but have not yet established them, the 
English/Welsh reference of “alternative business structures” or “ABSs” is often 
used, but by no means is it the only one used. Others include “new business models,” 
“new business structures,” “alternative business models,” and “liberalized 
structures.” In the US, “alternative business structures” and “ABSs” are also often 
used, but so are expressions like “alternative law practice structures,” (an expression 
occasionally used by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20), and “alternative law 
firm structures.” 
 
In the books, I have chosen to use the term “alternative structures” as a general, all-
purpose term of reference. I have done this for these reasons:  
 
— In order to reserve the terms ILP and ABS for reference to the Australian and 
the English/Welsh entities specifically, 
 
 — In order to distance the general concept of these kinds of organizations from 
the specifically Australian and the specifically English/Welsh manifestations of them 
(manifestations which, as compared to each other, have significant differences). In 
doing so, I seek to underline that while the United States can and should be informed 
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by Australian ILPs and English/Welsh ABSs, in creating its own versions of them, 
there is no need that to identically copy their terminology, much less create identical 
copies of the structures themselves. In other words, Australian ILPs and 
English/Welsh ABSs are only two of the many possible manifestations of these 
kinds of organizations—the term “alternative structures” is used to encompass all 
possible manifestations, 
 
— Because the term “business” is too limiting, and, for that reason, misleading. 
These structures are about much more than “business:” They are about new ways of 
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